We determined whether the Army effectively managed the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program during the production and deployment phase. Specifically, we evaluated whether program officials justified the low-rate initial production plan and whether test plans and results adequately prepared the program for full-rate production. This report is the first in a series of reports on the Army PIM program, which includes ammunition carriers and projectile-firing armored vehicles, called howitzers, for use in ground combat. During full-rate production, the Army will complete PIM vehicle production.
Finding
PIM program officials justified their plan to produce 133 initial production vehicles. The plan included 33 test vehicles and 100 production vehicles-the minimum necessary to maintain the production line and gradually increase production before full-rate production. Further, PIM program officials initiated system fixes to address seven of the nine performance deficiencies identified by the test community during the system development phase. PIM program officials also updated test plans to evaluate vehicle performance before full-rate production. However, Army Fires Center of Excellence, which developed PIM program operational requirements, and PIM program officials continued to address test community recommendations for deficiencies in the rate-of-fire requirement and the automatic fire extinguisher system (AFES). Army officials did not fully address two test community recommendations because:
• Army Fires Center of Excellence officials were revising the maximum rate-of-fire requirement for different firing conditions in the capability production document; and
• PIM program officials were exploring methods to fix the deficiency in the AFES in howitzer crew compartments after initially disagreeing with the test community recommendation.
As a result, Army Fires Center of Excellence and PIM program officials risk deploying vehicles that do not meet performance requirements and that could endanger crews. Additionally, PIM program officials may incur costly vehicle retrofits to address the deficiency in the AFES if not adequately addressed before full-rate production.
ii │ DODIG-2016-118 (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0003.000) compartment will delay fielding-risking soldier safety and decreasing Army capabilities. However, the Deputy did not support that incorporating additional AFES coverage would delay fielding the PIM program or how the delay would impact the mission, readiness, or cost. Further, the Deputy did not take into account the results and recommendations of the AFES engineering project or include a specific timeline for planned corrective actions. Without addressing the AFES deficiency, the Army could deploy vehicles that endanger crews. Therefore, we ask that the Program Executive Officer fix the AFES deficiency before deploying the first vehicles. We also request that the Program Executive Officer provide an action plan and completion dates to address the results and recommendations of the AFES engineering project. Please see the Recommendations 
Army Modernized Howitzers and Ammunition Carriers
In 2011, the Army began the PIM program to modernize weapons vehicles that operate as a set of one ammunition carrier and one howitzer (see Figure) . The modernization aims to increase force protection and improve survivability, mobility, and lethality of the vehicles.
The howitzer is an aluminum-armored, tracked vehicle with a cannon and an automatic fire control system. The ammunition carrier supplies ammunition to the howitzer. 
Acquisition Guidelines for Production Phase
DoD guidance 3 states that the purpose of the production and deployment phase is to produce and deliver products that meet user requirements. The production and deployment phase includes initial production, operational tests, and FRP. Before FRP, the milestone decision authority will review and assess test results from the initial production phase to determine whether a program's performance is acceptable. Program officials must resolve critical performance deficiencies before proceeding to FRP.
Review of Internal Controls
DoD guidance 4 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs operate as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. PIM program officials' internal controls over the initial production plan and test plans and results were effective as they applied to the audit objectives.
3 DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015. The plan included 33 test vehicles and 100 production vehicles-the minimum necessary to maintain the production line and gradually increase production before FRP. Further, PIM program officials initiated system fixes to address seven of the nine performance deficiencies identified by the test community during the system development phase. PIM program officials also updated test plans to evaluate vehicle performance before FRP. However, FCoE and PIM program officials continued to address test community recommendations for deficiencies in the rate-of-fire requirement and the automatic fire extinguisher system (AFES). Army officials did not fully address two test community recommendations because:
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• FCoE officials were revising the maximum rate-of-fire requirement for different firing conditions in the capability production document; and
• PIM program officials were exploring methods to fix the AFES deficiency in howitzer crew compartments after initially disagreeing with the test community recommendation.
As a result, FCoE and PIM program officials risk deploying vehicles that do not meet performance requirements and that could endanger crews. Additionally, PIM program officials may incur costly vehicle retrofits to address the AFES deficiency if not adequately addressed before FRP.
PIM Program Officials Justified the Initial Production Plan
PIM program officials justified their plan to produce 133 initial production vehicles. The plan included 33 test vehicles and 100 production vehicles-the minimum necessary to maintain the production line and gradually increase production before the decision in March 2017 to begin FRP. The 133 initial production vehicles made up about 12 percent of the total planned quantity of 1,112 vehicles. PIM program officials outlined a production schedule for the 133 vehicles in the acquisition strategy. DoD guidance 5 states that program offices should document the rationale for an initial production quantity exceeding 10 percent of the total production quantity in the acquisition strategy. The acquisition strategy, approved by the milestone decision authority, stated that PIM program officials planned to produce 33 test vehicles and 100 more production vehicles-the minimum necessary to maintain the production line and gradually increase production before FRP. Table 1 which requires the DOT&E to determine the procurement quantity needed for operational tests.
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PIM program officials explained that the 100 additional initial production vehicles were the minimum needed to maintain production and gradually increase production before FRP. Federal law 9 states the initial production quantity is the minimum amount needed to support operational tests, establish an initial production base, and permit an orderly increase in the system production rate leading to FRP. PIM program officials stated that the production schedule started with three vehicles per month to meet test and logistics support requirements. The officials stated that once the contractor established the production rate 5 DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015.
6 As of April 26, 2016, PIM program officials planned to use 34 vehicles for testing. 7 The Army conducts logistics demonstration to evaluate PIM vehicle maintenance which includes tests, diagnostics, replacement, and repair of vehicle components. of three vehicles per month, the rate could not decrease without disrupting the production line. The officials also stated that the contractor planned to maintain the production line at the minimum rate of three vehicles per month before gradually increasing production in FY 2018 to prepare for FRP.

PIM Program Officials Addressed Deficiencies and Updated Test Plans
PIM program officials initiated system fixes to address seven of the nine performance deficiencies identified by the test community during the system development phase. In addition, PIM program officials updated test plans to evaluate vehicle performance before FRP. DoD guidance 10 states that the purpose of the production and deployment phase is to produce and deliver products that meet user requirements. The guidance:
• requires acceptable performance before a program proceeds to FRP, and
• allows a reasonable amount of concurrency between system development and initial production.
DoD guidance also states that concurrency can reduce time to deploy a system, but it can also increase the risk of design changes and costly retrofits.
Test Community Assessed the PIM Program Before Initial Production
DASD(DT&E), DOT&E, and ATEC officials assessed test results from the system development phase and reported their assessments to the milestone decision authority before the decision to begin initial production. Although the test community supported beginning initial production, each office identified PIM program deficiencies. We reviewed nine performance requirements that the test community reported were not met, partially met, or not tested before the decision in October 2013 to begin initial production. Table 2 summarizes performance deficiencies reported by the test community during the system development phase, before the decision to begin initial production.
10 DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015.
PIM program officials initiated system fixes to address seven of the nine performance deficiencies identified by the test community during the system development phase. 1 A primary requirement is critical to developing an effective military capability. 2 A secondary requirement will achieve a balanced system solution but is not critical enough to be a primary requirement. 3 A third-level requirement is not as critical as a primary or secondary requirement.
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Performance Deficiencies Under Review and Initial Production Vehicle Testing Continues
PIM program officials addressed or planned to address seven of the nine performance deficiencies identified in the system development phase before FRP. PIM program officials awarded a contract modification in January 2012 to implement system fixes to address performance deficiencies, and Army officials completed tests to validate fixes by March 2015. Army officials began developmental tests of initial production vehicles in May 2015 and will continue tests through September 2016. Additionally, PIM program officials updated test plans to verify system performance before the decision in March 2017 to begin FRP. PIM program officials addressed or planned to address deficiencies related to system net-readiness, force protection, survivability, digital fire control system, availability, obstacle crossing, and accuracy performance requirements. For example, the PIM program did not meet the system net-readiness 11 11 A net-ready system can operate on a network and exchange data securely. See Appendix B for a summary of performance deficiencies in the system development phase, planned corrective actions, and test plans and results from the initial production phase.
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FCoE Officials Have Not Resolved the Unclear Howitzer Rate-of-Fire Requirement
FCoE officials continued to address a test community recommendation to reevaluate and clarify the howitzer maximum rate-of-fire primary performance requirement before operational testing in October 2016. The PIM program capability production document, dated January 13, 2014, stated that howitzers must fire at a maximum rate of 12 rounds in 3 minutes and at a sustained rate of 1 round per minute.
Howitzers Failed Testing for Maximum Rate-of-Fire in the System Development Phase
Test community officials reported that howitzers passed the test for sustained rate-of-fire, but failed the test for maximum rate-of-fire before the decision to begin initial production in October 2013. Howitzers failed the test for maximum rate-of-fire in 13 out of 17 attempts during the system development phase tests in 2012 and 2013.
In 2012, howitzers failed the test for maximum rate-of-fire in all nine attempts. To improve howitzer performance, PIM program officials redesigned howitzer hardware and improved software. In addition, FCoE officials trained test crews with revised firing procedures. In 2013, after vehicle improvement and crew training, howitzers passed the test for maximum rate-of-fire in four out of eight attempts under nonstressful firing conditions. 12 12 The Acting DASD(DT&E) stated that nonstressful firing conditions occur when crew members use a single explosive charge and fire the howitzer cannon at a low angle.
Test community officials reported that howitzers passed the test for sustained rate-of-fire, but failed the test for maximum rate-of-fire before the decision to begin initial production in October 2013. However, test crews did not test maximum rate-of-fire under stressful firing conditions. 13 Before the decision to begin initial production in 2013, the test community recommended that FCoE officials reevaluate the howitzer maximum rate-of-fire requirement. The DOT&E will evaluate and report whether howitzers pass the test for maximum rate-of-fire under stressful firing conditions to the milestone decision authority before FRP. Table 3 shows test results for maximum rate-of-fire in the system development phase before and after PIM program officials improved howitzer hardware and software and FCoE officials trained test crews. The PIM program capability production document, dated January 13, 2014, stated that the Army must equip howitzer crew compartments with automatic fire detection and suppression systems that automatically detect and extinguish hazardous fires. The AFES monitors and extinguishes fires from petroleum, oil, lubricant, or from an explosion in the personnel heater. PIM program officials designed howitzer crew compartments with one AFES sensor near the personnel heater.
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During the system development phase, ATEC officials did not test the AFES on PIM vehicles because a production-representative AFES was not available for testing until 2014. After the PIM program entered the initial production phase, ATEC officials tested AFES on PIM vehicles from August 2014 through May 2015. ATEC officials reported that the AFES did not protect the entire howitzer crew compartment during fire survivability testing. The test community recommended that PIM program officials investigate ways to incorporate additional AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments. ATEC officials reported that the AFES did not protect the entire howitzer crew compartment during fire survivability testing. 
PIM Program Officials Disagreed with Test Community Recommendation but Explored Methods to Fix Deficiency
PIM program officials initially disagreed with the test community recommendation to provide additional AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments. In January 2015, the DOT&E recommended PIM program officials fix the AFES deficiency in howitzer crew compartments based on preliminary AFES test data. However, PIM program officials stated that the howitzer AFES functioned as designed. PIM program officials also stated that howitzers contained several layers of protection, including two portable fire extinguishers, to mitigate potential fire vulnerabilities.
(FOUO) In September 2015, ATEC and DOT&E officials recommended that PIM program officials incorporate additional AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments based on finalized test data on fire survivability. The test data on fire survivability showed that howitzer crew compartments were vulnerable to fires. In response, PIM program officials initiated an engineering project to explore methods to expand AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments. However, PIM program officials did not plan to redesign the vehicles in the near term because expanded AFES coverage could impact vehicle performance.
PIM Program Officials Initiated an Engineering Project
In October 2015, PIM program officials initiated an engineering project to analyze the expansion of AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments. PIM program officials stated that the contractor would evaluate extensive redesigns, including additional AFES sensors. Specifically, PIM program officials required the contractor to:
• analyze the impact of increased AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments;
• evaluate extinguisher requirements in howitzer crew compartments;
• propose different options for AFES sensor and extinguisher locations;
• evaluate the impact of additional AFES coverage on the control panel;
• (FOUO) recommend the best course of action for full crew compartment AFES coverage and
• estimate cost and timeline for design and implementation.
(FOUO)
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U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Comments
The Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, agreed with the recommendation, stating he approved a request to clarify the rate-of-fire requirement for different firing conditions in the capability production document on May 6, 2016. He agreed to clarify the requirement before operational testing. As of June 7, 2016, Headquarters, Department of the Army, planned to review and approve the rate-of-fire requirement change.
Our Response
Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. 
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Program Executive Office, Ground Combat Systems Comments
The Deputy Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, responding for the Program Executive Officer, disagreed with the recommendation, stating the PIM program howitzer is more capable and safer for the crew than the previous system. He stated that the previous system does not contain automatic fire suppression in the crew compartment. He also stated that the PIM program howitzer is the first Army self-propelled howitzer to include automatic fire suppression in the crew compartment.
The Deputy stated the Army would need to significantly redesign and delay fielding the PIM program howitzer to add more AFES coverage in the crew compartment. He also stated the fielding delay will risk soldier safety and decrease Army capabilities. The Army may consider a future redesign of the PIM program howitzer crew compartment to increase cannon range capabilities. The Army may separate the ammunition compartment and improve fire suppression in future redesigns.
The Deputy stated the PIM program howitzer met AFES requirements. Specifically he stated the:
• PIM program howitzer is equipped with an AFES in the engine and crew compartment to automatically detect and extinguish hazardous fires;
• PIM program howitzer is equipped with engine and crew compartment internal and external manual backup fire suppression systems;
• PIM program and other Army vehicles use common AFES sensors and extinguishing agents;
• PIM program howitzer is equipped with an AFES sensor and nozzle directed at the personnel heater; and
• PIM program howitzer included two portable fire extinguishers. 
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Our Response
The Deputy Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, did not address the specifics of the recommendation. We agree that the PIM program howitzer includes fire suppression in crew compartments and is designed to meet the AFES requirements the Deputy cited. However, test data on fire survivability from August 2014 to May 2015 showed howitzer crew compartments were vulnerable to fires and that the AFES did not protect the entire crew compartment. The PIM program capability production document stated that PIM vehicles will be subjected to combat zone threats, such as direct or collateral damage from ballistic missiles and rockets, and blasts from improvised explosive devices. These impacts could initiate fires in howitzer crew compartments; therefore, the ability to rapidly extinguish fires is necessary to protect crews.
Furthermore, two members of the test community recommended changes to the AFES. In January 2015, the DOT&E recommended PIM program officials fix the AFES deficiency in howitzer crew compartments based on preliminary AFES test data. In September 2015, ATEC and DOT&E officials recommended that PIM program officials incorporate additional AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments based on finalized test data on fire survivability.
The Army provided no supporting documents, information, or analysis to show that incorporating additional AFES coverage in the howitzer crew compartments could delay fielding. Further, the Army provided no support to show mission, readiness, or cost impacts if fielding delays occur.
As stated in our report, in October 2015, PIM program officials initiated an engineering project to analyze the expansion of AFES coverage in howitzer crew compartments. PIM program officials tasked the contractor to propose different options for AFES sensor and extinguisher locations; estimate cost and timeline for design and implementation; and recommend the best course of action for full crew compartment AFES coverage. On July 7, 2016, the Product Manager, Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems, stated the contractor completed the engineering project. However, the contractor had not provided the report to PIM program officials.
Although the Army may consider a future redesign to improve fire suppression, the Deputy did not include a specific timeline for planned corrective actions or take into account the results and recommendations of the AFES engineering project. Without addressing the AFES deficiency in howitzer crew compartments, the Army could deploy vehicles that endanger crews. Therefore, we ask that the Program Executive Officer fix the deficiency in the AFES in howitzer crew compartments before deploying the first vehicles. We also request that the Program Executive Officer provide an action plan and completion dates to address the results and recommendations of the AFES engineering project.
• To determine whether test plans and results adequately prepared the program for FRP, we reviewed seven primary and two secondary performance requirements that the test community reported as deficiencies at the time of the decision to begin initial production. In addition, we reviewed one third-level requirement deficiency related to crew safety. The 10 performance requirements were: net ready, force protection, survivability, rate-of-fire, digital fire control system, howitzer and ammunition carrier availability, obstacle crossing, firing accuracy, and AFES.
We reviewed legal requirements and policy guidance in the following United States Code and DoD issuances:
• Section 2399, title 10, United States Code, "Operational test and evaluation of defense acquisition programs," January 2012;
• Section 2400, title 10, United States Code, "Low-rate initial production of new systems," January 2012;
• DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015;
• Army Training Circular 3-09.8, "Field Artillery Gunnery," November 15, 2013; and
• Army Regulation 385-10, "The Army Safety Program," June 14, 2010.
Use of Computer-Processed Data
We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.
Use of Technical Assistance
We did not use technical assistance in conducting this audit.
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